Department of Economics

Mental Models and Economic Policy: Neo-liberalism and Its Competition, Claremont Graduate University,
April 1-2, 2005 - "Papers"

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Armijo, Leslie Elliott (2005). "National Capitalisms Outside The Industrial Core: Organizing Money In 19th Century India."
The slides that I showed in my talk on the future of market-oriented economic reform (a.k.a. soft neoliberalism) in Latin America were drawn from the initial sections of this paper.  My essential point is that *mass* democracy has underappreciated beneficial consequences for the macroeconomic policy framework in developing countries.  [ISA 2005 paper & summary of three chapters of my current book.]

Armijo, Leslie Elliott and Faucher, Philippe (2005). "When Do Countries Cope Well with External Shocks?  The Politics of Bouncing Back in Argentina and Brazil"
This essay takes three recent exchange rate crises in Argentina (2001) and Brazil (1999, 2002) and asks what explains one country's (Brazil's, in this sample) ability to better anticipate, accept, and move forward from a severe external economic shock.  My co-author, Philippe Faucher, and I attempt to "tell" the observed outcomes by means of three contrasting mental models: a) the geo-strategic concerns of G7 countries, causing them to extend aid differentially, b) the incentives to policymakers created by the specific policy regime and/or the sectoral distribution of socioeconomic interests (i.e. what Tom Willett, Jeff Frieden, or Ernesto Stein would term "political economy"), and c) national decision making styles within the country's set of political institutions, taken as a system.  [ISA 2005 paper.]

Armijo, Leslie Elliott (2004).'MASS DEMOCRACY: The Real Season that Brazil ended inflation?
My answer is "yes."  This is an application of Leslie's mental model of the interaction of mass democracy and economic policymaking to contemporary Brazil.  [Also drawn based on the book, but currently under review as a stand alone paper.]

Armijo, Leslie Elliott (2001). "The Political Geography of World Financial Reform: Who Wants What and Why?" Global Governance, Vol. 7, No. 4, November 2001, pp. 379-396.  
This paper sketches four contending mental models of "reform" of the international financial architecture, whose advocates I term, respectively: laissez faire liberalizers, transparency advocates, financial stabilizers, and anti-globalizers.

Boyle, Nigel (2005). "Neo-liberalism and Labor Market Policy in Britain and Ireland: Ideational Coalitions and Divergent Policy Trajectories."

Goyal, Ashima (2005). "Puzzles in Indian Performance: Deficits without disasters", Chapter 12 in India Development Report 2004-05, Kirit S. Parikh and R. Radhakrishna (ed.), New Delhi: IGIDR and Oxford University Press, 2005.

Goyal, Ashima (2004). "Dictatorship, Democracy and Institutions: Macro Policy in China and India", (with A.K. Jha), Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 42, 4664-4675, October 16, 2004.

Goyal, Ashima (2003). "Budgetary Processes: A Political Economy Perspective", Chapter 2.2 in India Infrastructure Report 2003, Public Expenditure Allocation and Accountability, Morris S. (ed.), New Delhi: 3iNetwork and Oxford University Press, 2003.

Goyal, Ashima (1999). "The Political Economy of the Revenue Deficit", in India Development Report 1999-2000, Kirit S. Parikh (ed.), New Delhi: IGIDR and Oxford University Press, 1999.

Horowitz, Shale (2004). "Structural Sources of Post-CommunistMarket Reform: Economic Structure, Political Culture, and War."  International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 755778

Snider, Lewis W. (2004). "Wellsprings of Holy Terror in an era of Globalization: Neo-Liberalism versus Islamic ideas in the Middle East."

Willett, Thomas D (2002). "Why Is There So Much Disagreement About the IMF and Reform of the International Financial Architecture?"



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